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Vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) are recognized as significant nosocomial
pathogens that are predictive of mortality and a longer duration of hospitalization.
1
Nationwide surveillance data in Korea showed increasing resistance of Entero-
coccus faecium to vancomycin among clinical isolates, ranging from 2.9% in 1997
to 16% in 2006.
2 Outbreaks and endemicity of VRE have also been reported in
Korean hospitals.
3,4 The increasing prevalence of VRE poses important problems
because of limited effective antimicrobial therapy for VRE infection and the increa-
sing risk for transfer of vancomycin-resistance genes to methicillin-resistant Stap-
hylococcus aureus (MRSA) in Korean hospitals where MRSA have been endemic.
Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) recom-
mendations and the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA)
guidelines have been developed for preventing transmission and endemicity of
VRE and have widely been circulated.
5,6 These extensive guidelines have proven
to be effective for control of nosocomial spread or outbreaks of VRE, but might be
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too expensive to implement, especially in a setting where
resources are limited. In Korea, there are limited expe-
riences regarding the current guidelines for intervention
strategies for control of VRE outbreak.
In September 2006, we identified a VRE outbreak across
three intensive care units (ICUs) of our hospital. This pro-
mpted us to implement intensified control measures for the
following 5 months. In this study, we describe the molecular
epidemiology of the outbreak, as well as the intervention
strategies that resulted in successful control of the out-
break. 
Setting
Our study was conducted in the 52 ICU beds of an 850-
bed tertiary care hospital: 20 beds for medical ICU
(MICU), 20 for surgical ICU (SICU), and 12 for combined
ICU (CICU). All three ICUs are located on the same floor.
Standard infection control measures, including alcohol-
based hand hygiene practices and contact isolation for all
patients colonized or infected with VRE, were in place in
the ICUs before the VRE outbreak.
Description of the outbreak
A patient in CICU was identified as an index case; this
patient was admitted on  June 20, 2006 and received hemo-
dialysis due to acute renal failure. She was complicated with
bloody diarrhea and E. faecium sepsis. After her death on
July 18, 2006, surveillance cultures detected VRE in 4 sam-
ples of 12 patients’ rectal swabs, 2 of 25 environmental
surfaces and 2 of 25 health care workers’ (HCWs) hands;
the immediate response was contact isolation of the colo-
nized patients, extensive cleaning of the environmental
surfaces, and strengthening of hand hygiene. However,
follow-up surveillance cultures on September 4, 2006 detec-
ted VRE in 4 samples of 9 patients’ rectal swabs and one of
29 environmental surfaces in the CICU. In addition, we
found three patients with VRE isolation from clinical culture
in MICU and SICU: one had been transferred from CICU to
MICU on July 22, 2006 and the other two patients had been
cared for by doctors who had cared for VRE patients in
CICU. The hospital infection control unit recognized these
findings as dissemination of VRE across three ICUs, and
urgently established a VRE cohort in the CICU and simul-
taneously implemented intensified control measures.
Intensified control measures implemented
Creation of a VRE control team
The task force team for VRE control was composed of two
infectious disease specialists, three head nurses from the
three ICUs, and an infection control practitioner. The team
weekly monitored the VRE acquisition rates and made
decisions on control measures.
Cohorting of VRE carriers
Starting on September 10, 2006, two cohorts of patients
were established on each side of the CICU for a month. All
VRE-infected or colonized patients were placed in the
VRE zone where strict contact precautions with gowns and
gloves were maintained. Patients who had VRE-negative
rectal swabs on admission were placed in the designated
clean zone. Four beds between the two zones were closed.
Each cohort had a dedicated nursing staff and patient-care
equipment, and movement of nursing staff between the
two zones was strictly prohibited. Portable radiologic exa-
minations were conducted under strict barrier precautions.
Transfer of patients to the VRE zone had to be approved
by the VRE control team. VRE cases in MICU and SICU
were placed in isolated rooms under strict contact precau-
tions.
Active surveillance cultures for VRE 
To detect and monitor patients with new VRE acquisition,
we conducted weekly rectal surveillance cultures for all
patients who stayed in the ICUs for more than 24 hours
throughout the study period. Acquisition rate and preval-
ence were calculated every week by surveillance and
clinical cultures to monitor the trends of VRE outbreak in
all three ICUs.
Environmental cultures and cleaning 
Environmental decontamination was conducted with
extensive cleaning practices for environmental surfaces in
all three ICUs. Environmental surfaces were rigorously
cleaned three times a day throughout the outbreak. The
decontamination included cleansing with 5% sodium
hypochlorite. Environmental surveillance cultures for VRE
were performed to monitor environmental contamination.
Swab samples were taken from the vicinity of patients (i.e.,
the locker, over-bed table, mattress, pillow, the oxygen
supply and suction apparatuses, etc.) and general areas (i.e.,
equipment, nurses’ station, and computer keyboards and
terminals).
Antibiotic control policy
Our hospital has a computerized antibiotic prescription
system with a restriction policy for the use of 15 agents,
including vancomycin and ceftriaxone, requiring approval
from infectious diseases specialists. During the period of
outbreak control, doctors were encouraged to limit empiri-
cal use of vancomycin and all third-generation cephalos-
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porins in ICU patients. Consumption of third-generation
cephalosporins and vancomycin was calculated to monitor
monthly quantities and expressed as antimicrobial use
density (AUD; defined daily doses per 1,000 patients-day).
7
Information and education for all hospital staff
We informed all health care workers (HCWs) of the VRE
outbreak through the hospital’s intranet. Heightened
infection control measures, especially hand hygiene, and
enhanced auditing of these measures were enforced. We
noted whether each person washed his hands before and
after visits to the ICUs. The conducted rate of hand wash-
ing was about 95% after monitoring began.
Laboratory methods
To isolate VRE, clinical specimens were inoculated on 5%
sheep blood agar and incubated for 48 h at 35˚C in a 5%
CO2 atmosphere. Rectal and environmental swabs were
inoculated on Enterococcosel culture plates (Difco Labo-
ratories, Detroit, MI, USA) containing 15 µg/mL vanco-
mycin and 8 µg/mL clindamycin at 35˚C in ambient air for
48 h. Presumptive Enterococcus species were identified by
conventional biochemical methods, including chromo-
genic agar for VRE screening (bioMerieux, Marcy I’Etoile,
France) and the Vitek 2 GP card (bioMerieux).
A multiplex polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was
performed to detect vanA genes, as described previously.
8
Vancomycin and teicoplanin multifaceted control inter-
ventions were determined by E-test (AB Biodisk, Solna,
Sweden) using Mueller-Hinton agar.
Genomic DNA, prepared from patients’ and environ-
mental isolates, were digested with the restriction endo-
nuclease SmaI and analyzed by pulsed-field gel electro-
phoresis (PFGE) on the CHEF-DRII system (Bio-Rad,
Hercules, CA, USA) as previously described.
9 The banding
patterns were interpreted according to the published
criteria.
10
Control of the outbreak
A total of 50 VRE-positive patients were identified through
surveillance (n = 39) and clinical cultures (n = 11) in three
ICUs during the study period from September 4, 2006 to
January 29, 2007. With implementation of the intensified
intervention, the weekly prevalence of VRE decreased gra-
dually from 9.1/100 patients-day in early September to
0.6/100 patients-day by the end of January, 2007 (Fig. 1). 
We performed a total of 756 rectal surveillance cultures
and identified 43 (5.7%) VRE carriers. Among the VRE
isolates, E. faecium was the most common isolate (90.7%,
39/43). E. faecalis was isolated from 2 patients, and E.
avium and E. gallinarium were detected from one patient
each. Four patients simultaneously showed VRE isolation
from clinical cultures. The weekly rectal acquisition rate of
VRE was 6.9/100 patients-day in early September and drop-
ped to 0/100 patients-day by the end of January 2007 when
we declared the termination of the VRE outbreak in the ICUs. 
Environmental decontamination
Environmental surveillance cultures for VRE were perform-
ed three times (July, September and October 2006) before
and after implementation of the extensive cleaning prac-
tices for environmental surfaces in the ICUs. A total of 113
environmental samples were examined. Out of a total of
54 environmental surveillance cultures from the CICU in
July 2006, three (5.6%) samples were VRE-positive. After
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Fig. 1.Weekly prevalence and acquisition rates of vancomycin-resistant enterococci cases in surveillance cultures during the 5-month outbreak control period (cases
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environmental cleaning was introduced, subsequent
cultures performed in September and October 2006 showed
no VRE isolation except one VRE-positive sample from a
computer keyboard in the MICU.
Antibiotic consumption 
We calculated the monthly consumption of third-generation
cephalosporin and vancomycin, and compared them to the
respective amounts in the pre-intervention period (from
April 2006 to August 2006) and the intervention period
(from September 2006 to January 2007). There was a dec-
reasing trend in the use of third-generation cephalosporins
(AUD, 292.7 ± 39.9 vs. 256.2 ± 27.6, p = 0.132) and van-
comycin (AUD, 360.6 ± 25.9 vs. 310.8 ± 48.6, p = 0.078)
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Table 1.Results of PFGE Typing, vanA- PCR and E-Test of 19 VREF Isolates from the Outbreak
PFGE
E-test
Teicoplanin
Serial no. Age Gender Ward
type 
vanA PCR vancomycin 
MIC (µg/mL)
MIC (µg/mL)
1 72 M SICU A1 + 256  48
2 25 M SICU D2 + 256  192
3 70 F SICU D3 + 256  48
4 64 F SICU D1 + 256  48
5 48 F SICU D1 + 256  96
6 80 M MICU E + 256  24
7 78 M MICU D4 + 256  96
8 79 M MICU B + 256  48
9 81 F CICU C1 + 256  48
10 66 F SICU C2 + 256  96
11 29 M SICU D1 + 256  64
12 75 F MICU A1 + 256  256 
13 40 M MICU A3 + 256  96
14 86 F CICU A1 + 256  96
15 76 M CICU A1 + 256  192
16 59 F CICU F + 256  96
17 71 M CICU B + 256  32
18 67 F MICU D1 + 256  24
19* CICU A2 + 256  32
+, Positive; PFGE, pulsed-field gel electrophoresis; PCR, polymerase chain reaction; VREF, vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium; MIC, 
minimum inhibitory concentration ; SICU, surgical intensive care unit; MICU, medical ICU; CICU, combined ICU.
*An isolate from environment culture of ICU.between the two means, however, the difference was not
statistically significant (Fig. 2).
Molecular analysis of the outbreak
Twenty-one VRE isolates collected from surveillance cul-
tures during the two early months of the outbreak were
available for molecular analysis, including vancomycin-
resistant Enterococcus faecium (VREF) (n = 19) and
vancomycin-resistant E. faecalis (n = 2). All 21 isolates
carried the vanA gene according to the multiplex PCR
assay and E-test. PFGE analysis of 19 VREF isolates
showed polyclonality of 6 types (A to F), with two predo-
minant types, A (31.6%) and D (36.8%) (Table 1). Distri-
bution of the PFGE types in the three ICUs over the initial
six weeks is shown in Fig. 3. The A and D clonal types were
associated with two small clusters with inter-ICU spread:
The cluster of clonal type A with an environmental isolate
(A2) occurred initially in CICU and then spread to SICU
and MICU. Clonal type D clustered in SICU in mid-
October 2006 and then spread to MICU. 
Herein, we described a VRE outbreak across all three ICUs
of a university hospital and the successful control of VRE
following implementation of multifaceted interventions.
Although a number of administrative obstacles regarding
reimbursement and staffing issues remained to be solved,
establishment of a cohort ward, active rectal surveillance
for VRE, contact isolation, and extensive environmental
cleaning and cultures were carried out simultaneously to
prevent VRE endemicity and the rising threat of vanco-
mycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in our ICUs.
The initial transmission of VRE was identified in patients
and environments in an ICU that housed the index case
which was complicated with VREF sepsis and profuse
diarrhea. Hand hygiene practices were reinforced, and
contaminated environmental surfaces were cleaned, how-
ever, contact isolation of the VRE carriers was not adequate
due to the limited numbers of single rooms available.
Transmission of VRE to two adjacent ICUs soon followed
and might have been facilitated by frequent movement of
patients between ICUs and HCWs’ poor compliance to
contact precautions. 
A total of 50 patients colonized or infected with VRE
were identified in three ICUs during the control of the
outbreak from September 2006 to January 2007. Molecular
analysis of VRE isolates from rectal surveillance cultures
during the initial two months of the outbreak revealed that
E. faecium carrying the vanA gene was likely the epidemic
strain. Polyclonal distribution of the VREF genotypes over
three ICUs indicated inter-ICU transmission of these
clones, as well as potential horizontal transfer of the mobile
vanA gene element.
11,12 In addition, two clusters of A and D
clonal types suggested that clonal spread might have
occurred among patients via the contaminated hands of
HCWs involved in the care of infected or colonized pati-
ents.
13-15 Isolation of the same epidemic type from environ-
mental cultures also indicated the role of environmental
contamination in this outbreak.
In our study, we applied an aggressive strategy to control
the VRE outbreak immediately after the outbreak was
recognized in the units. It consisted of cohorting of VRE
cases and staff in a dedicated ward, active surveillance
cultures for monitoring and early detection of VRE trans-
mission in the units, and daily environmental decontamina-
tion, according to previous studies and SHEA guide-
lines.
6,16-21
In particular, the VRE cohort ward in one of the three
ICUs was quickly established from the beginning of the
intervention, because there were limited numbers of single
rooms available for isolation of several patients with VRE
who still were being treated under critical care. Cohorting
can be very effective for physical segregation of VRE pati-
ents, potential staff carriers and environmental reservoirs.
These are known risk factors associated with VRE outbreak.
An additional advantage of cohorting is intensified comp-
liance with isolation guidelines.
20,22 Nonetheless, we main-
tained the cohorting for only a month due to administrative
obstacles. The remaining VRE patients were then placed in
single rooms in the ICUs or general wards. 
Although active rectal surveillance for VRE acquisition
and isolation practices have not still been generalized in
ICUs of Korean hospitals, we confirmed that this practice
allowed earlier detection of colonized patients, prompted
proper conduct of contact precautions, and decreased
person-to-person transmission.
21,23 Moreover, weekly
monitoring and reporting of the rectal VRE acquisition
Control of a VRE Outbreak
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Fig. 3. Time course of pulsed-field gel electrophoresis typing during the
vancomycin-resistant enterococci outbreak. 
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SICU D1rates to HCWs were useful tool for evaluating the effect of
ongoing control measures and provided good feedback.
As reported by others,
14,24 our findings on environmental
contamination with VRE which is identical to the epidemic
strain suggest that the environment may play a major role
as a reservoir in this outbreak, probably through transmi-
ssion from the unwashed hands of HCWs. Therefore,
extensive cleaning of the environmental surfaces was an
important part of our intensified interventions and might
have affected the outbreak control. 
In our study, the antibiotic control policy to limit empiri-
cal use of vancomycin and third-generation cephalosporins
did not significantly reduce the consumption of the anti-
biotics, probably due to the high prevalence of serious con-
ditions in the target population of our ICUs, especially
where methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA) had been
highly endemic. Although recommended as one of the
strategies to control VRE outbreak,
5,25-27 other studies have
shown that controlled vancomycin use did not reduce VRE
transmission.
28,29 Furthermore, VRE eradication was
achieved with use of other control measures in the absence
of other antibiotic control except for vancomycin restric-
tion, as well as with a continued high prevalence of
antibiotic use in the ICU.
13,30
Our study has several limitations. We found it difficult
to evaluate the impact of each individual intervention on
the control of the outbreak. However, we believe that simul-
taneous implementation of these measures played a role in
more rapid and effective control of the outbreak, as we
identified multiple mechanisms of VRE transmission that
were probably involved in the occurrence of this outbreak.
The cost-effectiveness of the multifaceted control measures
was not determined in this study. We applied contact
isolation to all VRE carriers detected during the outbreak,
including two carriers with E. avium and E. gallinarium.
We did not confirm the presence of the vanA gene in E.
avium and E. gallinarium isolates, however, the potential
of the vanA gene transfer between them and E. faecium
needs to be addressed.
In conclusion, our study characterized the VRE outbreak
across three ICUs at the molecular level and disclosed
potential factors associated with VRE transmission. Our
study further suggests that an aggressive multifaceted
control strategy might be a rapid and effective approach
for controlling VRE outbreak in non-endemic hospitals.
This study was financially supported in part by City of
Seoul grant no. 10920 and by KICOS project (Battelle
Institute-Korea University) grant.
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